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21. SUMMARY
1. Poverty reduction is the over-arching objective of the EU’s development co-operation1 –
measured in the medium-term by progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.
Improving the performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and SOE reform, can have a
major impact on developing countries’ prospects of achieving those goals. The EU
furthermore aims to foster the integration of developing countries into the world economy, for
which the development of the business/private sector plays a key role.
2. For some years there has been heavy pressure on developing countries to reform SOEs.
This pressure has been prompted by the heavy burden of SOE losses and economic
inefficiency on macro-economic and fiscal balances and growth. Though the Commission has
often linked its budget support programmes to adjustment conditionality of the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWIs)2 and has been engaged in close and constructive talks with the
BWIs, it has not always been explicit on the specifics of SOE reform included in adjustment
programmes.
3. The objectives of SOEs reform have not always been made sufficiently clear. Some
possible goals – e.g. reducing fiscal deficits by reducing subsidies to SOEs or cashing
privatisation receipts – may conflict with others – e.g. ensuring low-cost access to services.
The Communication aims at clarifying key issues in this respect and argues for the
importance of making the objectives of reform explicit and clear. Only thus can trade-offs be
made transparently, and the achievements of each reform assessed.
4. There will usually be several possible ways to achieve these goals. The Communication
does not attempt to settle the debate on the advantages of different forms of ownership of
enterprises – public, private or PPP. Rather it argues for the essential importance of looking
objectively at all the options and their sequencing and selecting the one that best meets the
needs of the particular country and field. This needs to pay careful attention to the capacity
and resource constraints of the country.
5. Once objectives have been set and a reform option chosen, it will be essential to ensure that
progress is monitored. The lack of adequate monitoring in the past makes it impossible to
answer many questions about what has and has not worked in general. But one key general
lesson that emerges from all the experience to date is that an adequate regulatory framework
is essential for successful reform. Beyond that, solid conclusions on growth, employment,
service delivery, and fiscal impact of reform are elusive.
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36. Public utilities3 are something of a special case, and of growing importance in the debate.
They are frequently characterised by natural monopolies, and each field has specific
characteristics (and specialised language) that make the debate complex. The importance of
the regulatory framework is, however, particularly evident for all public utilities. In general,
the key issues are about the access, affordability and quality of each service4 - with realistic
target levels varying greatly according to the characteristics of a country, particularly its level
of development - and quality and efficiency of management.
7. To sum up, the objective of this Communication is to propose a more active role for the
EC in the debate on and the design of SOE reform in developing countries, with a special
emphasis on public utilities, in order to ensure that all the possible options are assessed before
choosing one and that reform is implemented in a transparent manner, with adequate
sequencing and regulatory frameworks and monitoring mechanisms. This Communication is
complementary to the one on private sector development in third countries being developed in
parallel.
2. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE COMMUNICATION
8. For the last two decades, the failures of SOEs and the resulting burden on fiscal balances,
economic efficiency as well as on access to basic services, have been at the centre of
structural reform programmes all over the world.5 The main responses to these problems in
both developed and developing countries have been market liberalisation and changes in
incentives and control – often through changed ownership. Though the impact of the
introduction of competition and a change in ownership cannot in practice be completely
separated, the Communication deals mainly with the latter.
9. For changes in incentives and control, the options ranged from commercialisation, through
alternative forms of management such as Public Private Partnerships (PPP), to partial or full
privatisation. Details are found in Sections 5-7 below. During the 1980s and 90s there was a
marked increase in the volume of divestiture of SOEs in virtually all the regions of the world.
Accurate figures are difficult to come by, but conservative estimates put the proceeds of these
sales at US$850 billion between 1990 and 1999. In developing countries, US$250 billion
were raised during this period and there was a 15% decline in the relative share of the value
added of state-owned enterprises in GDP6 due to privatisation and the slow growth rate of the
public sector.
                                                
3 Used here in the restricted sense of water, electricity, postal and telecommunications services and
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4 Using these words in their popular sense and not in the technical senses which they have taken on in
specialised debate on public services of general interest (e.g. COM(1996)281/03;
COM(2000)580
5 Privatisation in competitive sectors: the record to date by Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis.
6 Global Development Finance 2001 - The World Bank.
410. The growing number of studies on the reform of SOEs suggest that it is impossible to say
that one option or another is unconditionally “the best”7. The purpose of this Communication
is therefore not to suggest a “preferred” form of SOE reform – privatisation, restructuring,
PPP, or other. An unconditional public or private prone approach may not be fully consistent
with the EU position expressed in Article 295 of the EC Treaty relating to its internal market,
which establishes the EU neutrality as regards the issue of the ownership of any enterprise.
In this context, the importance of the private sector as an “engine for growth and source of
employment and revenue should not be undermined.” (COM(2000) 212 final : The European
Community Development Policy)
11. This Communication proposes a more active involvement of the EC on the issue. There
are compelling reasons to do so. First, the impact of SOE reform on the economies of
developing countries can affect the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, to
which the EU is firmly committed. This effect could be positive, through reduced fiscal
deficits, increased economic growth, improved provision of essential services and building of
management capacity, if reform is effective, or negative, through increased unemployment,
reduced access to basic services, loss of managerial and administrative know-how and
increased corruption if it is not successful .
12. Second, Member States have broad expertise in SOE reform. The EU has unique
experience of combining economic liberalisation with common “rules of the game”, and an
unequalled record of reconciling competitive markets with the provision of services of general
interest8. By recommending to developing countries examples based on its own experience,
the EU shows that it is not applying double standards.
13. Third, the EC already supports many SOE reform programmes – whether privatisation or
other forms of change – directly or, more often, indirectly within the framework of
adjustment programmes led by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs).
14. There has been a growing dialogue with the BWIs during the last years on a large number
of issues. However, if the EC wants to enhance the discussion with the BWIs on the design of
SOEs reforms, there is the need first to strengthen its own analysis and define guidelines. The
Communication therefore reviews the reasons behind the build-up of a large public sector in
developing countries. It notes the political nature of some of the key choices involved. It
highlights the reasons for reforming SOEs, discusses the risks and benefits of different types
of reform, and suggests lessons for best practice for both recipient governments and donors.
Finally, it makes some practical recommendations for enhanced involvement by the EC in the
reform process, notably the need to define and monitor the objectives of reform and to
examine all the options (including privatisation).
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8 e.g. in rail, road, and air transport, telecommunications, postal services, public broadcasting, water
distribution, sanitation, gas and electricity supply etc.
515. For the sake of clarity, the analysis will put special emphasis on the case of public
utilities, but given the range of sectors concerned, will come up with broader conclusions that
can be applied more generally (notably to the financial and competitive sectors). . The
liberalisation of agriculture and the reform of crop marketing boards have been excluded from
the analysis – not because they are unimportant but because they have too many specific
characteristics. In contrast, public utilities deserve special attention both because of market
structure (most are natural monopolies) and because of the substantial impact that the
provision of basic services such as transport, electricity and water has on the competitiveness
of the economy and on public health, and thus on poverty reduction. Within its own internal
market, the EU recognises the notion of general interest attached to the universal provision of
such services, and in a number of areas provides for specific obligations to be met by any
public or private provider. While the minimum standards might be very different in
developing countries, many of the principles can be valuable in providing policy insights.
3. THE BUILD-UP OF LARGE PUBLIC SECTORS
16. In many developing countries the build-up of a strong public sector dates back to the
colonial period and the first initial years of subsequent independence. With the surge in de-
colonisation, political leaders sought greater national control of the economy, especially the
activities on which their countries depended most for foreign exchange earnings. This led to
the nationalisation of many foreign companies during the 1960s and 70s and to the acquisition
of companies in strategic sectors such as petroleum and mining in order to influence corporate
policies on production, pricing and investment. Import substitution and accelerated
industrialisation were often the justification for the creation of SOEs in manufacturing.
Similarly, banks were nationalised or state-owned banks established to contribute to rapid,
state-led development or to meet challenges that the private sector was seen as ignoring, e.g.
providing rural credit.
17. In developed economies, in particular in Europe, state ownership also experienced a
period of popularity just after the second world war and later in the 60s and 70s when it was
seen as a way of protecting employment levels (especially in Europe). As recently as in the
1980s there was a wave of nationalisation in France, and a number of calls elsewhere for the
state to bail out ailing industries. State ownership was also considered a solution to market
failures in sectors of natural monopoly. By entrusting SOEs in these sectors with general
interest objectives rather than profits, they were expected to be able to adjust prices, quality
and output towards more socially efficient levels.
18. In the 1970s the criticisms of this model of state economic management gained
momentum, particularly in developed countries. In developing countries, while some SOEs
operated well, many experienced severe problems, creating heavy fiscal burdens. The low
productivity of investments in SOEs was a burden on the economy as a whole. Others
suffered from a lack of resources for essential investments. Insufficient provision of basic
services hindered competitiveness and particularly harmed the poorest. . Essentially political
choices about the level of subsidy for basic services became entangled with technical debates
about the quality of SOE management.
64. THE NEED FOR SOE REFORM
19. In financial terms, SOEs in developing countries often performed very poorly. Many
firms operated at a loss, entailing heavy opportunity costs to the national economy and a
heavy fiscal burden for the State through explicit subsidies, the assumption of operating
losses, or re-capitalisation costs made necessary by the continued erosion of the capital
structure of enterprises.
20. In non-financial terms, the results of SOEs in developing countries were also frequently
disappointing. Their provision of goods and services has often been deficient. Water and
electricity supplies, in particular, are often limited and unreliable, hindering the country’s
competitiveness and harming public health, while very few SOEs in manufacturing are able to
compete internationally9.
21. The main factors determining the performance of enterprises, whether private or public
sector, can be summarised as incentives and capacity. Among the key influences on the
performance of SOEs have been two important aspects of incentives, political interference
and unclear objectives (often reflected in the absence of a genuine budget constraint).
Similarly there have been two important capacity constraints, skills (including technology)
and funds (whether for investment or for working capital), which have also limited their
ability to deliver.
22. Politics played an important role in the expansion of the public sector in developing
countries and is at the root of these management problems. The level of political interference
in SOE management has been high in areas such as investment, tendering, pricing,
employment levels and appointments. There are many examples of public utilities being
prevented – chiefly by political considerations – from raising charges to cover marginal costs,
without an explicit political decision on the level and incidence of such implicit subsidies. A
further widespread problem has been extensive overstaffing, often linked to political
patronage.
23. Capacity and financial constraints also contributed significantly to management
weakness and played a decisive role in the poor performance of many SOEs. The impact of
all these problems is further aggravated by the lack of competition, especially in less
developed countries where regulation and the rule of law are weaker. The lack of an
appropriate legal framework made it harder for these countries to mobilise the foreign and
local financial resources that might have allowed them to maintain an appropriate level of
investment.
24. This does not mean that SOEs are necessarily mismanaged. Nor are they unique in their
problems: the private sector in most developing countries has not always been immune from
political interference (although the channels of influence were more direct with SOEs).
Private sector enterprises also suffered from a number of governance problems and
management deficiencies that led to progressive and generalised losses of competitiveness.
However, the management problems of the public sector in developing countries have
monopolised the debate. The reform of SOEs became a priority issue after the debt crisis of
the 80s. But plus attention tended to focus on the means – usually ownership changes – rather
than the ends – reduced fiscal deficits, higher quality or lower cost of outputs, employment
generation, even economic growth – and hence the key political issues, such as the level and
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7distribution of subsidies, were all too often lost from view in “technical” debates on the
ownership structure of enterprises10.
5. SOE REFORM OPTIONS WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
25. Answers to these problems in both developed and developing countries have usually been
sought in market liberalisation and ownership changes. It can be difficult to separate the
effects of the two, since price liberalisation or removal of barriers to the entry of private
competitors often accompany ownership changes. On the other hand, in several cases,
privatisation without liberalisation has shown mixed results for societies. However, this
Communication will focus mainly on the question of SOE reform, considering the objectives
of reform and the options available to Governments to attain them.
26. The preferred choice of many governments was commercialisation, i.e. subjecting the
operation of public firms to market-related management disciplines through a range of
different contractual forms, hard budget constraints and where possible competition, with the
state retaining ownership. This was intended to capture the benefits of private ownership
without the loss of public assets.
Reform of the Water Sector in Burkina Faso: a successful tale of commercialisation.
During the 90s the national water provider ONEA underwent extensive technical and management
restructuring, including the separation of rural and urban water supply. This aimed to make the
public utility commercially viable and extending both water and sanitation access to low-income
areas for an affordable price. The government identified its objectives clearly through a series of
policy documents setting time-bound targets for reform. At the end of the process, in 1999,
ONEA had achieved 95% cost recovery and 80-85% of the population served with clean water,
regardless of their income – better than most of Africa.
Sustainability of service provision and affordability were secured through higher tariffs for
large consumers in order to cross-subsidise social tariffs for lifeline consumption, allowing tariff
revenue to cover operational and capital costs. Improvement in access to water was mainly
obtained by connecting existing small-scale systems to the network and placing commercially-
operated kiosks in informal settlements. This allowed for a minimum service affordable to all, and
tackled the problem of unregulated mobile vendors. Quality was improved through government
investment programs and subsidies for installing sanitation.
There was heavy pressure for privatisation, but the strong political commitment of the Burkina
Faso Government and the support of some EU Member States, and the provision of technical and
financial assistance by the whole donor community, made reform within the public sector a
success.
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827. The range of management reform options within the public sector also includes price
liberalisation, the removal of barriers to the entry of private competitors, the introduction of
performance contracts, and greater autonomy given to the managers of state-owned
enterprises to determine prices, hire and fire employees and make investment decisions.
Market testing of particular functions, to secure value for money by comparison with private
sector options, has also been used to improve internal efficiency, though government capacity
to manage these mechanisms is a constraint in many cases.
28. On the other hand, it is often argued that SOEs still remain vulnerable to political
interference in decision making and subject to weak financial discipline (partly because of
state-owned or politically influenced bank lending)11. This interference also applied to staff
matters. Many appointments to senior management positions were made on the basis of
political connections. SOE reform within the public sector sometimes did little to lessen the
burden on public finances, in a context of declining international assistance. In such cases, the
privatisation of public firms would depoliticise economic decisions, put an end to the
mismanagement and corruption seen as endemic in SOEs, and lead to improvements in
productivity, fiscal performance, service delivery and profitability. In fact, bilateral and
multilateral donors encouraged governments in developing economies to embark on
privatisation for many reasons, with insufficient assessment of the objectives involved.
29. More recently, the peculiar market structure of public utilities (e.g. natural monopoly,
large sunk costs) lent itself to another variant of reform: Public Private Partnership – a
transfer of operational control to private providers while maintaining (majority) ownership in
public hands. Contracts can greatly vary in terms of duration and obligations for both actors
and usually seek to introduce competition not within the market but for the market. A more
detailed description of PPPs is found in Section 7, with a subsequent discussion of the range
of issues raised by the peculiarities of public utilities (Section 8). Nevertheless it is too soon
to evaluate the efficiency of these new instruments that are in most cases still evolving.
30. Finally, the recent poor financial, operating and safety performance of some privatised
firms (particularly in public utilities) in developed countries has led to experiments with other
forms of ownership, such as mutualisation. In this case the assets are vested in a non-profit
company funded by bond issues rather than shares, and any profit is then reinvested in the
company. The company is usually controlled by relevant stakeholders – service users, the
local community, national government, workers in the enterprise, and the commercial private
sector are often represented. The advantages are firstly that the firm is run commercially but
not owned by private shareholders, and secondly that it can pursue public interest concerns. It
is not yet clear whether such an approach can be applied in developing economies, given its
reliance on suitable legal, administrative and financial infrastructures, as well as on customers
with the ability to pay and on sufficient incentives for effective management and safeguards
against capture. In view of its limited track record, it is not covered in further detail in this
Communication. However, it seems to merit more exploration than it has so far received.
6. PRIVATISATION , SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
31. Though exact figures are not available, the empirical evidence shows a growing number
of privatisations in developing countries. Proceeds increased particularly in the 90s and in
1999 they were four times the level of 1990, following a peak of six times in 1997.
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32. In recent years there have been many studies and reports on the outcome of privatisation.
From the abundant literature available there emerges a mixed message.
33. In commercial sectors, empirical evidence confirms large efficiency gains from the joint
implementation of privatisation and market liberalisation12. There is consensus that the
profitability, productivity and output of firms improve substantially after reforms. New capital
investments are sometimes made to upgrade equipment13. Such gains are particularly evident
for high and middle-income countries, while low-income economies indicate more mixed
results. Privatisation and liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa and transition economies of the
former Soviet Union, for instance, have not always achieved the results expected in terms of
efficiency. In these cases, ineffective public administrations, fragile legal systems, weak
regulatory capacities and poorly-developed financial markets seem to be at the root of the
limited success.
Examples of privatisation with a positive impact14
Privatisation can have a positive impact on firms financial performance. In Kenya, profits of the
Housing Finance Company, privatised in 1992, rose by more than 100% between 1992 and 1993.
Privatisation has also enabled firms to diversify product lines and upgrade and rehabilitate facilities. In
Uganda, Shell International reported that privatisation allowed the firm to concentrate on core
activities and to contract out noncore activities such as canteen services and gardening. Investment far
exceeded the requirement under the privatisation deal to invest $10 million over three years: in just
two years $13 million was invested in new and rehabilitated filling stations.
Management changes and new investments associated with privatisation have resulted in
improvements in performance. In Ghana, the acquisition of a majority stake by Lever International in
Unilever Ghana Limited, which increased its shareholding from 45% to 70%, brought about
significant changes in the company. It gave the investor the necessary flexibility on matters relating to
strategic direction, capital investment, mergers and acquisitions. The capital investment made has
enabled the company to reduce unit costs and to report a 50 % increase in production without
increasing energy consumption.
                                                
12 Birdsall N. and Nellis J. (2002). Winners and Losers: Assessing the distributional impact of
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13 The divestiture of the Polish cement plants in the mid-90s with the contractual obligation for the new
owners to invest in their development is a case in point.
14 From Privatisation in Africa by Oliver Campbell White and Anita Bhatia.
10
34. Financial sector reform deserves further attention, since the creation of a competitive and
commercially-oriented banking system is not only important per se, but can enhance the
success of SOE reform in all sectors. Bank divestitures have produced substantial savings
(e.g. Argentina) and, in transition economies like Estonia, Hungary and Poland, privatisation
has led to better outcomes because of bank restructuring early in the transition. State-owned
banks tend to hinder stock exchange activity, have often high ratios of administrative
costs:revenue and, above all, concentrate their lending on other SOEs, allowing them “soft”
budget constraints. However, banking privatisation in Chile (70s), Mexico (90s) and South
East Asia (late 90s) was accompanied by severe financial crisis because of weak regulatory
frameworks and lack of monitoring and enforcement procedures.
35. The outcome of privatisation has varied widely between countries and sectors, and as a
function of the sale process, but there is evidence that it enhanced efficiency more than equity.
Many SOEs were overstaffed and retrenchments had a significant impact on income
distribution. Where applied, severance schemes were expensive, but without them job losses
pushed many ex-employees towards poverty. Evidence for gains in overall economic growth
is not certain and recent studies indicate that poor regulation and the absence of broad
institutional reforms may be the reasons undermining the positive impact of privatisation on
growth15. Fiscal proceeds and the end of subsidies to large loss-makers substantially
contributed to the reduction of public deficits in developing countries. However, there is still
room for improvement since proceeds have often fallen well short of those expected, for
reasons including delayed payments, lack of transparency, and limited government capacity to
monitor and enforce contracts.
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) : the sad saga of a flawed reform process
ZCCM, with its own farms, schools and hospitals, was more than a company, accounting for more
than 10% of Zambia’s GDP and at one stage 90% of total exports and 70% of foreign currency
earnings. After nationalisation in 1972, lack of maintenance and capital re-investment, and wide-
spread mismanagement, reduced ZCCM’s copper output from a peak of 720,000 t in 1969 to just over
286,000 t in 1999. At the time of its privatisation it was losing US$1-1.5 million a day (9% of GDP in
2000) and had a total indebtedness of US$1 billion.
The Privatisation Act entrusted the Zambia Privatisation Agency with the responsibility for all
divestiture, a task it had been performing in recognised transparency and honesty. Instead, the
privatisation of ZCCM was carried out in an opaque manner by a special negotiating committee
appointed by the President, amid wide-spread allegations of corruption and asset stripping. Attractive
bids were declined and the process stalled for several years, while the Asian financial crisis led to a
sharp fall in copper prices. Potential buyers either lost interest or sought to renegotiate their deals.
Finally in 2000, after the World Bank withheld a $530 million credit until ZCCM was sold, the
divestiture process was completed. Many analysts contended that the deal compared very
unfavourably with the June 1997 bid by the Kafue consortium – especially when incentives to Anglo,
such as a cut in corporation tax, a 20- year exemption from profit tax and a reduced power tariff, are
taken into account. This rather generous treatment did not however, prevent Anglo from deciding to
halt its operations in Zambia in 2002 after it had spent over $350 million, leaving the government with
the daunting task of finding another operator.
36. The most frequent criticism of privatisation processes is their lack of transparency.
Public assets are transferred to private hands by non-competitive methods, fuelling the system
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of political patronage. This makes for suspicions of corruption. Lack of transparency, and
consequent corruption, also often reduce privatisation proceeds. A good example is the
Russian “loans for shares” privatisation scheme16 between 1995 and 1997. Privatisation of
copper mining in Zambia is a further example of how lack of transparency and adverse market
trends can lead to serious shortfalls in divestiture proceeds (see box above).
37. Sales revenue can be also be reduced because of the absence of real competition in
bidding, or a lack of bargaining power on the part of the government. For important sectors
like network industries, the level of investment and technical expertise required of the private
provider limit the number of companies able to bid. Cartel arrangements are highly possible.
Local businesses play very little part in such SOE reforms. In addition, limited capacity
prevents governments from carrying out complex price evaluations of SOEs and properly
managing the selection and negotiation stages. This often leads to inadequate prices and
unfavourable conditions attached to the sale.
SENELEC – two unsuccessful attempts at privatisation
The privatisation of the Senegalese electricity company, SENELEC, has been attempted on two
occasions without success.
On the first occasion in March 1999 a consortium bought 34% of the shares of SENELEC under
contractual obligations including service and investments levels. However, 18 months after handing
over the operations, the Senegalese government decided to end the contract, leading to an agreement
in January 2001 by which the government repurchased all the shares held by the consortium. It wanted
a larger investment programme and accused the consortium of not honouring its investment
obligations, while the consortium felt that SENELEC had been in a worse condition than they had
been told.
A second attempt at privatisation was initiated in July 2001. It was decided that 51% of the shares
would be allocated to a “strategic partner” on the basis of the purchase of existing shares and an
increase in capital, thereby making available funds for investment as well as increasing the capacity of
the company to seek further debt finance. In addition the obligation to carry our out investments would
be more clearly defined. This process too was unsuccessful: two bids were received but neither bidder
completed a deal. The government is now re-examining the options for privatisation.
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38. Privatisation may also be unsuccessful in the absence of an appropriate regulatory
framework. This is particularly important for sectors where it is practically impossible to
introduce competition, creating a risk of going from a public monopoly to a private one, with
serious consequences for social welfare. In developing countries, the absence of proper
regulation is often linked with the pressure to sell off SOEs as quickly as possible in order to
free resources to reduce the fiscal deficit or to meet donor conditions, as well as to lack of the
technical and financial resources it requires. It can also be connected with the fact that the
divestiture of an unregulated monopoly is much more profitable. As a result, enforcing ex-
post regulations, to ensure competition or to control monopolistic situations, becomes very
difficult.
39. Finally many privatisation processes have suffered from inadequate monitoring
mechanisms during and after the transfer of public companies to private ownership. Clear
contracts, followed by transparent monitoring and enforcement, are crucial to devising
solutions, overseeing and reporting on the smooth working of the enterprises themselves, and
ensuring that the new private owners honour their commitments and that the state fulfils its
obligation vis-à-vis local communities and any workers made redundant.
7. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE OUTRIGHT SALE OF
PUBLIC ASSETS
40. The difficulties encountered by privatisation operations in developing countries have often
reduced the pace of entire programmes and led the donor community to consider alternative
options to outright divestiture in their support to public sector reforms. One of these options
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41. Public-Private Partnerships are basically a contract between a private investor and the
state for the provision of a service. There are different types of contracts, of which the table
above17 gives a few examples. In exchange for the provision of a service, the private promoter
receives fees, rights or receipts depending on the type of agreement.
42. It is worth noting that any of these forms can be focused on a range of objectives. Their
choice is a political one, of course within a range given by e.g. availability of resources as
well as other demands. Thus the emphasis can be on access, affordability and quality of
service, or on maximum fiscal gain, or on employment protection, or any other policy
priority. What is important is that objectives be specified clearly in the contract, and then
compliance be monitored. Ideally the level of subsidy should be transparent, so that the
political choices associated with different subsidies – the crucial questions of who gets how
much subsidy – can be explicitly addressed.
43. Investment in private infrastructure projects began from a relatively low base in the early
1990s, reached a peak of $123.3 billion in 1997, declined in 1998 and 1999 in response to
crises in emerging markets, and resumed their upward trajectory in 2000 (see Figure 2).
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44. By 2000 some 154 developing countries had concluded this kind of deal to develop their
infrastructure. Between 1990 and 1998, PPPs were estimated to have had a total value of
some US$496 billion: $14 billion representing Africa’s share, $237 billion for Latin America
and the Caribbean, $147 billion for Eastern Asia and the Pacific and $38 billion for Southern
Asia.
                                                
17 Source: African Development Bank 2002.
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45. By sector, telecommunications has dominated investment, with some $292 billion during
1990-2000. Electricity accounted for $197 billion, transport $125 billion, water and sewerage
$37 billion, and natural gas transmission and distribution $33 billion.
46. PPPs have come in for increasing political criticism, partly because of the loss of national
control implied by foreign multi-national companies operating essential services and partly
because of the loss of jobs often associated with reform. The process of contracting has also
been open to the same criticisms as that of privatisation, with concerns over transparency and
the risk of corruption.
47. Developing the local private/business sector is an important goal of co-operation,
particularly for economic growth. The private sector may also have an important role,
depending on particular national arrangements and at the behest of the state, in the provision
of public services. However, market failures mean that there remains an important role for
public action in these areas. Public utilities are, as noted above, perhaps the most common
form of PPP. They have a number of special characteristics18, whatever the form of ownership
under which they operate, and hence merit more in-depth analysis.
8. PUBLIC UTILITIES
48. Public utilities are a sub-set of the broader category of services of general economic
interest. This Communication focuses on the subset of greatest significance for development,
which always includes water supply and sanitation, basic transport infrastructure and
generally electricity and postal services. Telecommunications also fall within this category in
almost all developing countries, and in most cases some public transport services are also
included. However, the aspirations to universal provision which would apply within the EU
are often unattainable in the short to medium term in many developing countries.
49. The European Union takes a neutral stance on the ownership of public utilities, and
recognises that an issue of general interest could be attached to the universal provision of
basic services by these utilities. The concept of universal service “refers to a set of general
interest requirements that guarantee that everyone has access to certain essential services of
high quality at prices they can afford, in industries where these services are provided through
a network”19. In developing countries, tackling issues such as access, affordability and
quality is particularly important, given the extremely narrow reach of existing networks, the
low potential and immaturity of markets in specific areas (e.g. rural) and sectors (e.g.
sanitation) and the poor quality of service, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods. Thus,
the impact of reform on poverty is expected to be far-reaching.
50. “Basic needs” has been variously interpreted in development literature and in further
different ways in the debate on services of general interest within the EU. Similarly, “access”
has been used in the development literature to cover a range of issues differentiated in the
public services debate (access, coverage etc.), while “quality” also encompasses issues such
as absence or interruption of service as well as the technical usage of the term in public
service debate.
                                                
18 Notably the scale of their fiscal impact, their market structure – frequently a natural monopoly – and
their direct impact on poverty. They also form a large part of the SOEs remaining after previous rounds
of reform.
19 The Services of General Interest in Europe. Communication of the European Commission, OJ C
 281, 26.9.1996, p. 3.
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Services of general economic interest in the EU
Services of general economic interest (SGEI) are a key element in the European model of society and
the new Article 16 of the EC Treaty confirms their place among the shared values of the Union. Public
authorities consider the provision of such services (e.g. water and electricity supply, postal service) to
the population as necessary.
States are free to choose whether to provide them directly or entrust a private operator with their
supply.
When market forces alone cannot ensure a satisfactory provision of these services, public authorities
can lay down a number of specific service obligations, dealing mainly with access, affordability and
quality issues. The fulfilment of such obligations may trigger the granting of exclusive rights to private
or public providers and compensatory payments for the deficits incurred in the provision of those
services (within a limited amount in order not to distort trade and competition).
At the heart of this policy, lies the interest of the European citizens who have come to expect high
quality services at affordable prices.
51. Concerns have been raised that reforms in state-run public utilities may increase tariffs
and connection fees, worsening the conditions of low-income households. Whatever the
validity of such concerns, it is important to recognise that in most cases low-income
households in developing countries have not been adequately served by state-run public
utilities. In many cases, the great majority of poor people does not have access to the existing
subsidised or price-controlled services at all, but have to pay much higher prices (often well
above even unsubsidised prices to existing customers) for “informal” supplies of dubious
quality. Prices below cost recovery and lenient attitudes towards non-payers have also
frequently undermined the ability of utilities to expand their networks and maintain an
acceptable quality of service. In the water and sewage sector the impact of such situations on
the spread of water-related diseases has been widely documented20 while electrical fires due
to illegal connections are common among low-income households in developing countries.
52. PPPs in public utilities have contributed so far to the lessening of the financial burden of
loss-making SOEs and have generated resources for the state. Between 1990 and 1998 PPP
investments are estimated to have totalled nearly US$500 billion.
53. Access to water or electricity services has a mixed record in privatised SOEs. Among the
positive examples are electricity privatisation in Chile and Guatemala, and water privatisation
in Ivory Coast, Bolivia (La Paz) and Philippines (Manila). On the other hand, water
privatisation in Guinea, Argentina (Buenos Aires) and Bolivia (Cochabamba) failed to
achieve significant increases in connections, mainly because of excessively high connection
fees. Improvement in access is particularly evident in telecommunications. High rates of
service expansion have been experienced, for instance, in African and Latin American
countries. In this case the introduction of competition, made possible by mobile technology,
seems to be a decisive factor. In general, significant differences in access between urban and
rural or sub-urban areas remain across all sectors.
                                                
20 e.g. Ghana, see Vaz L. and Jha P. (2001). Note on the Health Impact of Water and Sanitation Services.
CMH Working Paper Series n. WG5:23. World Health Organisation.
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Bolivia water PPPs : a tale of two cities
In 1997 the Bolivian Government issued a 30-year concession for the private provision of
water and sanitation to La Paz and El Alto. Competing bids were judged on the number of
new connections offered for a pre-determined tariff: the winner contracted for almost 100%
coverage for water and 90% for sewerage. Complementary support through micro-finance and
community work helped to achieve these levels, together with substantial cross-subsidisation
– domestic fees were set at about half the cost of provision.
In Cochabamba, in contrast, the water company was privatised without competition. The new
owners decided to source water differently from the plans made by the public utility. They
trebled tariffs, but did nothing to improve quality or extend access to low-income households.
Following public protests, the company was re-nationalised and the assets given to the
municipality to run.
54. Affordability of services is ultimately a political decision, since a government can decide
what level of subsidy it wishes to provide, given other commitments in relation to resources.
It has usually been true that tariffs rise after reform, since prices were previously held below
cost recovery levels. This happened for example in Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and Guinea.
However, cost reductions due to increased efficiency can also lead to lower tariffs for
consumers, as happened in the water sector in the Ivory Coast, in electricity in Chile or
telecommunications in the United Kingdom. Sectors where it has been possible to introduce
some limited competition, such as electricity generating and telecommunications, are the ones
to show the best results in terms of affordability.
55. Quality of service generally improves after reform, as witnessed by a cross-section of
utilities and countries. Moving from the extremely low levels of quality provided by many
SOEs represents an important benefit, especially for sectors where public health is at stake.
However, the issue of raising quality still remains after reform. In perfectly competitive
markets there may be no need to regulate service quality, but in sectors characterised by a
natural monopoly it has been shown that providers tend to set low standards in relation to
price (especially in sectors with low price elasticity like water and electricity).
Morocco Telecommunications: a lucrative PPP in the form of a concession
In 1999, for instance, Morocco awarded a US$1.1 billion mobile phone concession for 15
years to Medi Telecom, a consortium of Spain Telefonica, Portugal Telecom and Moroccan
investors. The government used the proceeds, which represented half of its total annual
capital inflows, to repay some 6% of the country’s debts as well as make fresh investments in
the public sector. (source: African Development Bank) This example illustrates the positive
impact that Foreign Direct Investment can have in improving the quality of services and
economic performance of developing countries and in mobilising local and regional financial
resources.
56. The magnitude and incidence of these effects depend on three main factors: competition,
the regulatory framework, and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
57. The introduction of competition has positive results in terms of prices, service expansion
and quality (as shown by reform of the telecommunication sector in a number of countries)
which benefit the consumer. However, it has to be borne in mind that technological
constraints represent a barrier to competition in the majority of infrastructure sectors,
particularly electricity distribution, water supply and sewerage.
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58. A sound regulatory framework is essential. When competition is not a feasible option,
regulation acts as a substitute for the market, taking on some of the functions of a competitor
and addressing the monopoly power of the provider. Obviously there is no single approach to
the regulation of public utilities, and the outcome of regulation depends on the framework
chosen.
59. For the water and electricity sectors, there is evidence that poor people are often the losers
unless reform agreements are carefully constructed. However, if poverty-focused conditions
are built into an agreement it can have a positive impact on service provision. In the case of
water supply in Bolivia (La Paz), service expansion was obtained through connection targets
specified in the agreement with a private investor. In both Guatemala and Bolivia the net
proceeds of the sales of electricity companies were invested in network expansion. Targeted
subsidy schemes in Chile allowed the government to mitigate the impact of tariff increases
and improved the attractiveness of low-income customers to the provider. Where such
conditions were set the fiscal benefits of reform often decreased because of implementation
costs or lower prices offered by new managers. Thus the trade-off between revenue raising for
the public sector and consumer protection is difficult to escape. The choice remains ultimately
a political one.
60. Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms after reform are also vital. There is little
evidence of the extent to which the commitments made by the new managers in terms of
investment, labour conditions, or service delivery, have been met. There also seems to be little
sign of monitoring of the impact of privatisation or PPPs by governments: most reports are of
academic, donor, or civil society origin. The main reasons for this lack of monitoring stem
from weak legislative frameworks and a lack of resources for regulatory authorities. The
result is that the design of contracts is biased towards the provider, for lack of government
bargaining power and enforcement is weak, allowing opportunistic behaviour such as delays
in payment and maintenance and low quality standards.
9. GUIDELINES AND KEY ISSUES FOR SUCCESSFUL SOE REFORM
61. Governments need to define their objectives clearly, in ways that can be monitored
transparently. They must decide what is the most important issue for their citizens: service
quality or accessibility, fiscal gains or employment generation, taking account of benefits,
costs, resources and alternative uses. Trade-offs may occur, for example between productive
efficiency and employment levels, revenue raising and consumer protection or quality and
prices, as well as between needs and resources. It is therefore crucial for governments to set
priorities. Decisions like these, and those on subsidy level and incidence, are fundamentally
political decisions and need to be made explicit and transparent if governments are to be held
properly accountable.
62. Before deciding on a formula for reform, governments would need to examine all the
options, including restructuring within the public sector, PPP, privatisation, and
mutualisation, analysing the impact they are likely to have on access, affordability, and
quality of services and goods, on public finances and on the country’s economy. This
assessment should also take into account the employment and social consequences. The
reforms should be dealt with in an open and transparent process involving all relevant
stakeholders, especially since employment issues are often central to their acceptability.
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63.Transparency in both design and implementation is critical to the outcome of reform.
There are two main reasons for this: first, a lack of transparency implies higher risk of
corruption; and second, poor information during the process can undermine the confidence of
public opinion and oblige the government to reverse the reform. Donor support to improve
transparency can be crucial and it is important that their intervention be clearly separated from
the commercial interests of bidders from donor countries. Detailed and regular information
campaigns targeted to the whole population should be an integral part of this, which should
help to secure acceptability of the type of reform envisaged and of its consequences.
64. The design of the regulatory framework and monitoring of post-reform performance
are key issues, which have an influence on all the impacts analysed so far. There is no one
regulatory approach that fits all utilities, but rights to access, affordability and minimum
quality of the service should be guaranteed as a public interest, taking account of the
availability of resources. The benefits of a proper regulation and control range from direct
reduction of poverty to consumer protection, from better quality of service to less corruption.
Since developing countries may lack the capacity to tackle such issues successfully, donors
should pay careful attention to ensuring that they are addressed. Technical assistance may
need to be provided for the design of the legal framework, and selection and negotiation with
new managers. Financial assistance may also be needed, at least during the phase immediately
following reform.
65. SOE reform in developing countries requires a marked increase in the level of foreign
direct investment flows. For this to happen governments must create a conducive climate
based on peace, democracy and stability, a stable macroeconomic environment, a transparent
and predictable fiscal system, enforcement of the rule of law by an independent judiciary, and
respect for human rights. Indeed, Foreign Direct Investment goes primarily to countries that
have a good business climate, and developing countries must strive to improve theirs, with the
help of the donors. Similar conditions are needed to promote domestic private investment as
well. This is true for any form of change of ownership, whether privatisation, PPP, or
mutualisation; and indeed remains substantially true for successful commercialisation and
reform within the public sector as well.
66. As noted with regard to regulation, sequencing is crucial. An important sequencing issue
is the inclusion of the financial sector reform, given the impact, which unreformed banking
institutions, can have on the incentives confronting enterprises during the reform process.
Furthermore, financial sector reform has other benefits in its own right, notably in reducing
the scope for corruption and abuse of office and for increasing economic efficiency overall.
67. Gains in access, affordability, quality, greater efficiency, and improvement in the fiscal
position are the expected outcome of well-designed reforms in the medium and long run.
However, negative consequences at least in the short-term must not be underestimated, for
example in terms of job losses, reduced access to services, or increases in poverty levels with
negative consequences for stability and growth. Therefore any reform should include an
appropriate social protection strategy, not only in order to mitigate such negative
consequences, but more importantly to ensure its overall success. Any isolated reform effort
is unlikely to achieve its objective if it not embedded in a consistent package of mutually
reinforcing economic employment and social policies.
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10. THE ROLE OF THE EC IN THE REFORM OF SOES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
68. As one of the main development aid providers, the EC has long been involved in funding
and reforming SOEs in developing and transition countries of the former Soviet Union and
CEECs. It has done so in several ways. It has, through the EIB and ERBD, provided loans to
this sector and, sometimes, refunded severance costs in the course of industrial restructuring.
In a number of cases, it has financed the import of spare parts to allow an ailing industry to
resume production, and provided technical assistance to establish restructuring programmes.
69. The EC has also supported SOE reform directly in some Mediterranean and Tacis
countries. It has also supported them indirectly, as in the ACP region, through macro-
economic support programmes. In the latter case, it linked the budgetary aid it provided for
structural adjustment programmes supported by BWIs to the implementation of SOE reform
processes. Though the EC collaborates constructively with BWIs in many areas, it has not
generally been involved in the details of these reforms. However, given the importance of
successful SOE reforms for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, the EC
should now pursue a closer dialogue with the governments and the BWIs on the matter.
The policy conclusions above form the basis of this stance
70. It must where appropriate voice its concerns about the shortcomings of current
approaches, to the countries concerned and enhance its dialogue with the BWIs in this respect.
By using the broad range of expertise existing within its Member States the EC should
become a more active partner in trying to design such reforms to take more fully into
account its objectives of poverty reduction and enforcement of sound macroeconomic
frameworks in developing countries.
Discussions with the developing countries concerned, and with the BWI, should take place
prior to any SOE reform which directly or indirectly involves the EC . European Commission
Delegations entrusted with increased decentralised responsibilities would need to play an
active role in the discussions to be held at country level during PRSP processes or during
BWI missions, concentrating on the objectives of reform, identification and assessment
of reform options, including sequencing issues, the requirements of post-reform
regulation and monitoring and the need to address employment and social implications
in a consistent and integrated way. Member States should also be involved in these talks.
71. When a decision is taken on this basis, the EC should mobilise the appropriate
development policy instruments to back its implementation. Where a role for the
private/business sector (e.g. in privatisation or PPP) has been chosen as the best option, it
should include its instruments for private sector development in third countries. It may also be
able to help through its macroeconomic support programmes. The former can make financing
and investment guarantees available, particularly through the European Investment Bank.
Both can help to promote a favourable business climate, essential for attracting foreign and
domestic private investment, and assist in building the capacity to implement social protection
strategies.
72. On the other hand, this approach should avoid direct EC involvement in the
implementation of a SOE reform programme if there has been no assessment of the needs and
conditions for its success. Special arrangements should be made to review programmes of
support for SOE reform that have already been approved and are being implemented.
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73. Where SOE reform is already in hand, the EC should, when ever possible, make an
assessment of the conditions for its successful contribution to the overall objective of poverty
reduction and its specific concerns over access, affordability, quality, economic growth,
employment and fiscal impact. This, obviously, may take time to attain. Meanwhile, if a
country falls off track with the BWIs for failing to successfully carry out a SOE reform
programme, the Commission should aim to make its own assessment of the specific case and
the implications for its continued support – albeit initially relatively informally until a more
structured methodology can be developed and resourced.
74. The Commission should enhance its capacity to provide high-quality and timely
technical assistance to governments for the key stages of SOE reform. This should cover
the dialogue outlined above on the objectives of reform, identification and assessment of
reform options, including sequencing issues, and the requirements of post-reform regulatory
framework and monitoring, as well as the processes of contract design and the identification
of and negotiation with new managers (whether within the public sector or through ownership
change).
75. Some additional assistance might be provided in international promotion, to attract
investors interested in enterprise take-overs or in building partnerships with the state, where
those options are identified as optimal. If governments wish to divest after restructuring, they
might benefit from the expertise of high-level civil servants in the Member States who have
played a similar role in their own countries.
76. This new commitment should play a part in ensuring that SOE reform helps to deliver the
reduction in poverty that is the central goal of development policy.
